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In  the  absence  of  enforceable  contracts,  many  economic  and  personal 
interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although 
this  reliance  often  works  well,  sometimes  it  breaks d o w n .  Simple  rules 
mandating  minimum  standards  on  reciprocation  prevent  the  most 
egregious trust violations, but may also undermine behavior that would 
have  otherwise  produced  higher  overall  economic  welfare.  We  test  the 
efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum return rules using experimental 
trust games. We find that rules fail to increase trust and trustworthiness. 
Thus  low  minimum  standards  significantly  decrease  economic  welfare. 
Although sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and trustworthy 
behavior never returns.  
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Most social and economic situations are not explicitly contracted (Davis, 1992). When 
behavior is not mandated by enforceable rules, people tend to rely on reputations of 
trust and trustworthiness.
1 Even when rules exist, people often rely on trust to facilitate 
interactions  because  it  is  often  cheaper  than  a  reliance  on  active  monitoring  and 
enforcement. Spouses trust partners not to cheat. Drivers trust that oncoming traffic will 
stay  in  the  opposite  lane.  Investors  trust  businesses  to  act  in  the  investors’  best 
interests.  Lenders  trust  borrowers  to  repay l o a n s  and  depositors  trust  bankers  to 
behave  responsibly.  In  trust-based  situations,  people  likely  use  a  norm-based
2 
propensity  towards  cooperation  and  constantly  update  these  norms  with  information 
gleaned  from  sophisticated  evolved  psychologies  designed  to  detect  cheaters 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989 & 1992) and keep accounts of others’ goodwill exchange 
efforts (McCabe & Smith, 2000, 2001, 2003).  
Consider  the  two-player  two-stage  investment  game  of  Berg,  Dickhaut  and 
McCabe (1995), now widely known as the Trust Game. In the original game, an investor 
can invest any portion of a $10 endowment by sending it to a trustee. Both investor and 
trustee know that the amount sent triples in value before reaching the trustee. Having 
received the tripled investment, the trustee can reciprocate by returning any portion of 
the funds to the investor. Non-cooperative game theory predicts that because there is 
no required return, investment will be foregone: anticipating that the trustee will keep all 
                                              
1Reputation,  as  it  is  concerned  in  this  discussion,  is  an  entity’s  known  history  of  demonstrating  trust 
and/or trustworthiness. Trust is demonstrated by willfully ceding resources or control to another with the 
expectation  that  the  other  intends  to  reciprocate  and  not  be  opportunistic.  Trustworthiness  is 
demonstrated by not succumbing to opportunism so as to restitute the resources or control that another 
has ceded by extending trust. The amount of trustworthiness that can be demonstrated depends on the 
amount of opportunism available. 
2In this paper, we use “norms” to mean context-based expectations about interactions that coordinate 
behavior. 2 
 
funds received, the investor will invest zero. However, interactions in the trust game 
rarely  end  this  way.  Typically,  investors  send  a  share  of  the  endowment  and  most 
trustees, in turn, reciprocate (Camerer, 2003). Given the high frequency of trustees who 
reciprocate, a self-interested investor with accurate expectations of trustees may invest 
rationally (Trivers, 1971; Kurzban & Houser, 2005). The development of norms among 
socializing  groups  is  not  surprising  given  the  widespread  importance  of  trust  and 
reciprocity  in  everyday  relationships.  Axelrod  (1984)  demonstrates t h a t  a n  i n i t i a l l y  
trusting behavior, capable of contingent adjustment when the exchange partner proves 
untrustworthy,  can  be  an  evolutionarily  stable  strategy.  Research  also  shows  the 
importance of long-term reciprocity relationships and exchange of scarce and valuable 
resources within small-scale subsistence societies (Kaplan et al., 1985; Hawkes et al., 
1991; Gurven, 2004). This supports the notion that reciprocal exchange has an ancient 
origin and has been crucial to human evolution (Sahlins, 1972; Isaac, 1978; Lovejoy, 
1981).
3 
While  interpersonal  interactions  are  often  based  on  implicit  trust-based 
expectations  of  reciprocity  and  mental  accounting  of  reciprocation  histories,  modern 
society explicitly mandates many of the behaviors we rely on via formal rules and laws 
(Zucker, 1986). When a system based solely on trust does not work efficiently enough 
to prevent opportunism, we often rely on rules that establish minimum standards instead 
of  rules  that  fully  specify  behavior.  For  example,  the  USDA  imposes  a  minimum 
standard for meat inspection, corporations must meet minimum standards of disclosure 
                                              
3Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) suggest that natural selection has favored 
humans who had a propensity to establish reputations as cooperators and non-defectors, and who have 
been capable of gathering reputational information about others on which to condition their trust based 
exchange efforts. 3 
 
to  investors,  and  employers  must  pay  a  minimum  wage.  Minimum  standards  are 
attractive because they outlaw the worst abuses of trust relationships while being less 
costly  than  fully  mandated  interactions  (both  from  compliance  and  enforcement 
standpoints).  However,  when  used,  incentives  such  as  those  provided  by  minimum 
standards  may  backfire  (Bowles,  2009),  leading  a  significant  portion  of  people  to 
conclude something akin to “the minimum must be good enough, otherwise it wouldn’t 
be  the  minimum,”  thus  lowering  the  median  behavior  from  what  it  may  have  been 
without a minimum rule.
4 
We  study  how  exogenously  imposed  minimum  return  rules  affect  behavior  in 
experimental trust games. We modify the basic Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) trust 
game in three additional treatments where there are minimum return rules that require 
the trustee to return to the investor either 10%, 20% or 30% of the tripled investment 
amount received. Our results suggest that these rules erode trust that would otherwise 
occur.  In  most  of  the  cases  this  erosion  of  naturally  occurring  trust  and  resulting 
reciprocity was so large that it decreased overall economic welfare. When a minimum 
return rule of 30% was imposed, which almost entirely removes downside risk, it did 
manage to effectively restore economic welfare, however, neither trust nor trustworthy 
behavior was restored. 
In the baseline treatment with a mandated minimum-return of zero, subjects both 
invested and reciprocated more than classic economic theory predicts. Typical investors 
invested around half of their funds, signaling trust to trustees. Trustees who received 
investments  of  more  than  half  of  the  endowment  returned  a  median  of  45%  of  the 
                                              
4Recently, Fuster and Meier (2010) showed centralized norm enforcing mechanisms discouraged private 
development of norms, and thus decreased cooperation. 4 
 
income,  while  the  median  return  rate  for  those  who  received  half  or  less  of  the 
endowment was only 12% (note that a return of 33.33% or more of the income is a 
positive return on investment for the investor).
5 Thus, trustees reciprocated conditional 
on amounts invested in a manner consistent with previous findings (Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe., 1995; Pillutla, et al., 2003). When mandated minimum returns were greater 
than zero, both return rates and investment distributions were affected. The 10% and 
20% return rules actually resulted in smaller investments overall, while the largest 30% 
rule resulted in larger investments. Return rates by trustees who received more than 
half of the investor’s endowment were comparatively smaller for 10% and 20% return 
rules. Compared to the 0% rule, trustees who received half or less of the investor’s 
endowment had even lower return rates under 10% and 20% rule conditions. Trustees 
returned amounts close to the mandated minimum (10% median amount returned with 
the 10% rule, 24% with the 20% rule, and 30% with the 30% rule), as if believing the 
“minimum must be good enough.” 
In  the  next  section,  we  review  literature  suggesting  that  rules  may  have 
unintended  consequences  in  a  variety  of  situations.  In  Section  II,  we  present  our 
experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. Sections III and IV contain our results 
and analyses. We summarize and discuss implications and future research in the last 
section. 
                                              
5Returns can be defined from the point of view of the trustee or the investor. We define the “return rate” 
as the percentage of the amount received that is sent back by the trustee. Our rules are defined on return 
rates. We define “return on investment” as the rate of net profits on invested funds, that is the returned 
amount minus the investment divided by the investment. While there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between  these  measures,  return  rates  are  more  intuitive  when  discussing  behavior  of  trustees  and 
returns on investment are more intuitive when discussing behavior of investors. See Table 2 for details.  5 
 
I  Literature Review 
Since introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), the trust game has been the 
topic of intense research. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper but 
available elsewhere (e.g., Ostrom and Walker, 2003) for interested readers. 
Research in several areas suggests that institutionalized structures may actually 
increase the very behavior they are designed to avoid. For example, Titmuss, Oakley 
and Ashton (1997) suggest that providing financial incentives to give blood results in 
less blood contributions than with no remuneration. Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) 
provide supporting evidence from women’s blood donations that these institutionalized 
incentives  backfire.  Gneezy  and  Rustichini  (2000a)  give  another  excellent  example: 
when a formal rule (enforced by a fine) was implemented against late pick-ups, more 
parents (not fewer) picked up children late from day care. In the labor context, several 
studies (Frey, 1993; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Griffith, 1993) show that imposing 
monitoring  or  close  supervision  by  authority  actually  decreases  work  effort.  The 
“crowding out” of intrinsic motivation noted in these monitor-worker relationships may 
result  from  the  reduced  opportunity  for  the  worker  to  demonstrate  trustworthiness.
6 
These  examples  demonstrate  that,  where  behavior  is  not  primarily  controlled  by 
reputational concerns, but instead is mandated by adherence to institutional structure 
and a calculus of its consequence, counter-productive effects may result. 
In a game closely related to the trust game, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) studied the 
effect of a principal imposing a minimum performance requirement on an agent. In this 
                                              
6High work effort provides an opportunity for demonstrating trustworthiness when a worker is not being 
monitored and could otherwise shirk responsibility. A closely monitored worker does not have the same 
opportunity to escape reprimand for shirking and so, under supervision, work effort does not serve to 
indicate trustworthiness. 6 
 
principal-agent game, if the agent engages in a costly (to the agent) production process, 
he can increase the payoff to the principal. The principal can set a minimum effort level 
for the agent before the game begins. Falk and Kosfeld argue that setting a minimum 
effort level signals mistrust to the agent while setting no minimum signals trust and 
generates  reciprocating  behavior.  In  a  control  treatment,  they  exogenously  set  the 
minimum production level. In this treatment, the principal is not signaling mistrust by 
setting  the  minimum  level.  They  find  that,  when  restricted  by  the  principals,  agents 
actually delivered lower production for the principal than when they were unrestricted. If 
the restriction is imposed exogenously, production levels are similar to those observed 
when the principals choose not to restrict the agents. 
Finally, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) modified the trust game to allow investors 
to specify a “desired return” when sending money to trustees. In one treatment, the 
desired return is simply non-binding communication. In another, investors can impose a 
fine on trustees if the actual returned amount falls short of the desired return. Investors 
decide whether the fine will be imposed ex-ante and trustees learn this decision at the 
time of their choice. Thus, reliance on a fine signals mistrust to trustees. In either case, 
the desired return rate serves to communicate the specific expectations of investors. 
Return  rates  fall  when  a  fine  is  set  ex-ante  and  rise  when  a  fine  is  not  set.  Thus, 
implementing sanctions reduces reciprocity, but both the desired return set by investors 
and whether a fine is implemented signals expectations and investor trust. Whether a 
rule alone matters is thus confounded making it impossible to isolate the effect of the 
rule  alone  on  the  trust/reciprocity  relationship.  In  contrast,  our  rule  treatments 
exogenously set a minimum level that cannot be violated. Thus, the minimum may set 7 
 
the expectations of both players, but does not serve to communicate expectations from 
one party to the other. 
The  general  idea  embedded  in  the  Falk  and  Kosfeld  (2006)  and  Fehr  and 
Rockenbach  (2003)  work,  that  rules  have  adverse  consequences,  is  similar  to  our 
thesis.  However,  there  are  several  important  differences.  First,  by  using  and 
manipulating the trust game, we can separate trust and control. By setting the rule in 
their main treatment, the principal in Falk and Kosfeld’s game signals mistrust to the 
agent. Like their control treatment, our return rule is exogenous, neither signaling trust 
nor distrust. In their control game, the principal makes no decisions and, as a result, 
neither signals trust nor distrust. In our game, the investor is still signaling trust in the 
trustee by sending money. Thus, in both versions of our game, sending money signals 
trust to the trustee. These differences are important to consider in situations where rules 
are designed to replace or work in conjunction with internal motivations. 
II  Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Procedures 
A  Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s Economic Science Institute. 
Subjects  who  had  not  previously  been  recruited  for  trust-game  experiments  were 
recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students 
and randomly assigned into treatments described in  Table 1. Subjects interacted with 
each  other  anonymously  over  a  local  computer  network.  The  experiment  was 
programmed  and  conducted  using  z-Tree  (Fischbacher,  2007).  The  computers  were 
placed within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their 
own computer screen. 8 
 
The eight sessions each consisted of 18 to 24 subjects, lasted approximately 
thirty-five  minutes,  and  were  sequenced  as  follows.  First,  an  experimenter  read  the 
instructions  aloud  while  each  subject  followed  along  with  their  own  copy  of  the 
instructions. The instructions explained the experimental procedures and payoffs used 
in  the  experiment  (instructions  are  available  in  the  appendix).  After  finishing  the 
instructions, subjects were given five minutes to write down their answers to several 
questions to ensure that they understood the instructions. Subjects’ answers remained 
confidential from other subjects. After subjects completed the quiz, the experimenter 
distributed  a  printed  copy  of  the  correct  quiz  answers.  The  experimenter  privately 
answered any questions regarding the experimental procedures. 
Each subject was assigned a role, labeled person 1 for the investor and person 2 
for the trustee. The subjects participated once in the trust game described below. Each 
subject was paid a $7 participation fee and the payoffs from the trust game after signing 
a receipt. On average subjects earned $9.75 in addition to their participation fee. 
B  Experimental Design 
Subjects participated in one of the four treatments. In each treatment, the investor could 
send any portion of his $10 endowment to the trustee and the investment amount was 
tripled on the way. The trustee then decided how much to send back contingent upon 
the minimum return rule. In the baseline treatment (R0), the trustee could send back 
none of the amount received. In treatments R10, R20 and R30 trustee had to send back 
at least 10%, 20% and 30% of the tripled investment amount received, respectively.
7 
                                              
7A button was placed upon the trustees’ screen that, if selected, would trigger a pop-up window displaying 
the minimal amount that could be returned. 9 
 
C  Hypotheses 
If investors and trustees behaved strictly according to classical economic theory, the 
rules we impose should make no difference. In the single shot games we study, income 
maximizing  trustees  would  arguably  have  no  incentive  to  return  more  than  the  rule 
imposes. F or  the  parameter  values  of  the  rules  we  use,  the  returns  that  equal  the 
minimum mandated return would result in loses for investors and, therefore, investors 
would be expected to invest nothing in the first place. Of course, prior research on the 
game  shows  that  these  expected  behaviors  are n o t  typical.  Instead,  there  is  a 
distribution of voluntary trustee return rates that on average justifies some positive initial 
investment. Our first set of hypotheses therefore concerns how minimum required return 
rules affect this distribution of trustee return rates. 
Given the distribution of voluntary trustee return rates that typically arises without 
a  rule,  any  minimum  return  rule  might  mechanically  truncate  the  lower  tail  of  this 
distribution. Our first hypothesis is that a minimum return rule leaves all other aspects of 
the rule-free distribution unaffected. We call this the “truncation” hypothesis. This would 
increase the mean return but, unless the median return is truncated, it would leave the 
median unaffected. 
Alternatively, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) observe that reported social 
histories increase return rates even when the histories reveal that some prior subjects 
returned zero and the average return on investment is negative. The social histories 
seem to reinforce norms of reciprocity. It is possible that minimum return rules also 
reinforce  reciprocity.
8  Minimum  return  rules  may  suggest  selfish  behavior  is 
                                              
8In  other  contexts,  rules  have  been  shown  to  have  both  positive  and  negative  potential  effects  on 
otherwise cooperative behaviors. For example, Ostrom (2000) discusses some situations where poorly 10 
 
unacceptable  or  undesirable,  reinforcing  pro-social  behavior  and  resulting i n  greater 
reciprocation. In this case, minimum return rules will both (1) truncate the lower tail and 
(2)  increase  return  rates  in  the  rest  of  the  distribution  as  well.  We  call  this  the 
“reinforcement”  hypothesis.  Observationally,  this  would  increase  both  the  mean  and 
median return rates. 
In contrast, if rules substitute for norms, the incentives presumably provided by 
rules  may  backfire  as  Bowles  (2009)  suggests.  That  is,  the  mandated  return  rate 
increases  the  noise-to-signal  ratio  for  trustees  wishing  to  gain  reputations  as 
cooperators and limits the reputational benefits to trustees of costly signaling via returns 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Rules may cause trustees to abandon their own norms of 
how much to return, substituting the rule instead. Alternatively, rules may serve as focal 
points, attracting the entire distribution of return rates. In either case, while minimum 
return rules truncate the lower tail of the distribution, they also pull down the rest of the 
distribution toward the rule as well. We argue that this effect may hold in a strong form 
wherein the rule completely replaces other norms and return rates fall to the rule. We 
call this the “pure replacement” hypothesis. It may also hold in weak form, where the 
rule partially substitutes for norms of behavior, but does not completely replace norms 
of  reciprocating.  We  call  this  partial  substitution t h e  “ attraction”  hypothesis. 
Observationally,  this  will  decrease  the  median  return.  Two  factors  affect  the  mean: 
truncation of the lower tail and the downward shift in the rest of the distribution. The 
overall effect on the mean is ambiguous for the attraction hypothesis, but complete and 
                                                                                                                                              
designed  external  rules  have  negative  impacts,  but  appropriately  designed  internally  developed  and 
enforced rules may increase cooperative behavior in common pool resource games.
  11 
 
partial substitution are the only cases where the mean may actually fall because of a 
minimum return rule.  
The following four alternative hypotheses summarize the posited effects of rules 
on return rates. 
Hypotheses Set 1: Effect of Rules on Return Rates 
Truncation  Hypothesis:  Minimum  return  rules  truncate  the  lower  tail  of  the 
return  rate  distribution  as  mandated  by  the  rule  and  leave  other  aspects  of  the 
distribution unaffected. As a result, the mean return rate increases from R0 through R30 
and the median is unaffected unless it would otherwise have fallen below the rule. 
Reinforcement Hypothesis: When a minimum return rule is implemented it (1) 
eliminates  returns  that  would  otherwise  have  fallen  below  the  rule  and  (2)  also 
reinforces  norms  of  reciprocating,  increasing  return  rates  that  would  otherwise  have 
fallen above the rule. As a consequence, the mean and median return rates increase 
from R0 through R30 because of upward shifts in the entire distribution. 
Pure  Replacement  (Complete  Substitution)  Hypothesis:  When  a  minimum 
return rule is implemented, it completely replaces norms of reciprocating more than the 
rule dictates. As a result, all return rates equal the mandatory minimum, decreasing the 
mean  and  median  return  rates  to  the  rule.  As  the  rule  increases,  return  rates  will 
increase accordingly. 
Attraction (Partial Substitution) Hypothesis: When a minimum return rule is 
implemented it (1) eliminates returns that would otherwise have fallen below the rule, 
but also (2) substitutes partially for norms of reciprocating, effectively decreasing returns 
that  would  otherwise  have  fallen  above  the  rule  by  attraction  towards  the  minimum 12 
 
allowed. Specifically, the further a minimum return rate is below the “default” level of 
return  rate  otherwise  seen  in  R0,  the  more  it  will  lower  the  return  rate.  As  a 
consequence the median return rate decreases because of the downward shift in the 
distribution above the rule. There is an ambiguous effect on the mean because, while 
returns above the rule are shifted downward, returns below the rule are raised. As rules 
increase  to  their  maximum  possible  levels,  both  mean  and  median  return  rates  will 
ultimately  increase  because  eventually  the  truncation  effect  must  dominate  for 
sufficiently high rules. 
Our  second  set  of  hypotheses  concern  investor  behavior.  If  investors  are 
categorically predisposed to never invest, or believe that given their investment levels 
return rates will not be changed by minimum return rules, then rules should not affect 
investor behavior. These predictions form our “neutral” hypothesis. 
By  imposing  an  explicit  rule  mandating  minimum  returns  on  investment, w e  
unarguably decrease the downside risk to the investor. Specifically, R0 leaves the entire 
investment at risk, while R10, R20, and R30 leave 70%, 40%, and 10% of the original 
investment at risk, respectively. If investors respond solely to the value-at-risk, rules 
should  increase  investment.  We  call  this  the  “value-at-risk”  hypothesis.  A  similar 
outcome would arise if investors believed in the reinforcement effect on trustee behavior 
(see reinforcement hypothesis above), encouraging a stronger investment response. 
Alternatively,  rules  can  create  incentive  tradeoffs  by  simultaneously  limiting 
downside risk (encouraging investment) while also constraining information gathering 13 
 
opportunities (discouraging investment)
9, leading to a “U-shaped” investment response 
function. Minimum return rules decrease the availability of discretionary funds on which 
trustees can make decisions. As trustees are increasingly constrained with regards to 
the  proportion  of  income  that  they  can  decide  to  return,  investors  are  consequently 
provided less of the reputational information about what could have been done but was 
not. At the same time, the mandated return rate increases the noise-to-signal ratio for 
investors  desiring  to  gain  reputations  as  cooperators,  lowering  reputational  benefits 
gained from exhibiting trust (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). In accord with evolutionary 
theorists (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989), we propose that natural 
selection  has  favored  humans  who  had  a  propensity  to  establish  reputations  as 
cooperators and non-defectors, and who have been capable of gathering reputational 
information about others on which to base their trust based exchange efforts (see also 
discussions of “Goodwill Accounting” in McCabe & Smith, 2000, and Coricelli, McCabe 
& Smith, 2000). According to this theory, both the presence of potential monetary gains 
and reputational knowledge to be gleaned from risky investment in a novel exchange 
partner,  both  parts  of  the  trust  game,  evoke  trusting  behavior.  Specifically,  the 
“information” hypothesis proposes that investors in the trust game are not only making 
choices that will generate material gains from payouts, but are also making choices 
which  will  generate  reputational  information  about  the  trustee  with  whom  they  can 
interact. A trade-off between downside risk and information seeking benefits causes a 
U-shaped investment response function according to the “information” hypothesis. 
                                              
9It is also possible that investors may have beliefs that rules will shift the entire distribution of return rates 
according to the substitution hypotheses. Such beliefs can also discourage investments. 14 
 
Finally, we note that the economic efficiency of this institution is driven entirely by 
the investment rates. Thus, efficiencies move in lockstep with investment rates. So, any 
hypothesis on investment rates applies equally to levels of economic efficiency. 
The following three alternative hypotheses summarize the posited effects of rules 
upon investments and the resulting efficiency.  
Hypotheses Set 2: Effect of Rules on Investment Rates and Efficiency 
Neutral Hypothesis: Investment levels do not respond to minimum return rules. 
Value-at-Risk  Hypothesis:  Investors  respond  to  rule-truncated  return 
distributions  with  monotonically  higher  investment  levels  as  rules  increase  from  R0 
through R30. 
Information  Hypothesis:  Minimum  return  rules  create  incentive  trade-offs  by 
simultaneously  limiting  both  downside  risk  and  information  seeking  benefits.  These 
tradeoffs result in a U-shaped investment response function. 
We test these hypotheses using the observed distributions of return rates and 
investment levels. First, we ask how the return on investment varies with the rule and 
investment  levels..  Second,  prior  research  suggests  a  more  complex  relationship 
between investment levels and returns than our simple hypotheses do. In particular, 
starting with Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), researchers have noted that higher 
investment levels generate both higher absolute returns, higher return rates and higher 
returns on investment. We believe that higher investment levels generally signal more 
trust  and,  in  response  to  more  demonstrable  trust,  trustees  reciprocate  with  more 
trustworthiness  (returning  more  than  the  minimum).  However,  rules  like  the  ones 
implemented in this study affect the amounts of trust and trustworthiness that can be 15 
 
demonstrably  signaled.  Rules  restrict  the  discretionary  space  that  trustees  have 
available for demonstrating reciprocation. If investors trust because they are seeking 
information about trustworthiness and rules about mandated minimum returns decrease 
this information content, then rules, investment levels and return rates will interact in a 
complex way. We investigate these relationships more fully with a regression analysis. 
III  Results 
Table  2  gives  several  definitions  that  we  use  in  the  discussion  of  investments  and 
returns. Figure 1 shows the mean and median amounts sent and returned under each 
rule. Examining the trustee and investor behaviors we find the “U-shaped” responses 
predicted by some hypotheses. Next, we closely examine impact of rules on returns and 
investments. 
A  Effect of Rules on Return Rates 
Figure  2  shows  the  distribution  of  return  rates  (defined  at  the  percentage  of  funds 
received  that  are  returned  by  the  trustee)  under  each  rule.  The  two  colors  in  the 
histogram bars represent return rates when the investment levels were above or below 
$5 (50% of the initial endowment). Evidently, rules affect return rates. 
Under a 0% minimum return rule, there are two modes, one near 0% and one 
centered somewhat below 50%. Table 3 Panel A gives the overall mean return ($6.65 
or 29% of the amount received), median return ($7.00, 35%) and the percentage of 
observations where the return rate was within $0.01 of 0% (17%). It also shows the 
median  excess  return  rate  above  the  mandated  minimum.  We  interpret  this  as 
trustworthiness.  In  this  case,  it  is  simply  the  median  return  rate  (30%)  because  the 
minimum required return is 0%. 16 
 
Under a 10% minimum return rule, there remain some returns in the 35% to 50% 
range, but the dominant mode is 10%. The mean return drops (to $4.36, 22%) as does 
the median (to $1.50, 10%). The median excess return rate falls to 0% because more 
than  half  (57%)  of  the  subjects  return  within  $0.01  of  the  10%  minimum  mandated 
return  rate.  Thus,  as  represented  by  the  discretionary  returns  above  the  mandated 
median rate, trustworthiness disappears for the typical trustee. That is, the rule drives 
out otherwise trustworthy behavior. 
Under the 20% and 30% rules, the return rate distribution is forced up by the rule, 
but the dominant mode remains the rule. The excess median return rates are 7% and 
6%, far below the 35% excess median return rate that arose under a 0% rule. Thus, 
voluntary discretionary reciprocity (trustworthiness) never returns to the levels observed 
under the 0% rule. 
In summary, the immediate effect of a low minimum return rule is to decrease the 
mean  and  median  return  rates,  reduce  the  level  of  reciprocity  and  increase  the 
percentage  of  trustee’s  who  return  no  more  than  the  minimum  required.  As  the 
minimum  rule  increases,  the  mean  and  median  return  rates  rise  mechanically  as  a 
result, but reciprocity remains low while the percentage of trustees returning no more 
than the rule remains high. Unambiguously, rules reduce trustworthiness. A Kruskal-
Wallis Test (given in Table 3 Panel A) shows that these effects show up as significant 
differences in the distributions of return rates. This pattern is only consistent with the 
weak form of the substitution hypothesis giving our first result: 
Result 1: Rules have significant effects on the distribution of return rates that are 
consistent only with the attraction hypothesis. 17 
 
Figure 2 shows that under all rules, the distribution of return rates under each 
rule is higher conditional on the amount sent being larger than $5. Comparing Table 3 
Panel A to Panel B shows that the mean, median and median excess return rates are 
uniformly lower when the investor sends less than $5. The percentage of trustee’s who 
return the minimum is uniformly higher. While return rates are universally lower, rules 
still  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  distribution  of  return  rates  in  this  subsample. 
Comparing  Table  3  Panel  A  to  Panel  C  shows  that  the  mean,  median  and  median 
excess return rates are uniformly larger when the investor sends more than $5. The 
percentage of trustee’s who return the minimum is uniformly lower. However, in this 
subsample,  rules  do  not  appear  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  return  rate 
distribution. This leads to our second result: 
Result 2: Return rates and levels are affected by the amounts sent. 
In both Table 3 Panel B and Panel C, the mean return rates drop between the 
0% and 10% rules. Then, they rise as the rule increases. For investments of less than 
$5, a Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on return rates is 11.597 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value < 
0.01. In contrast, for investments of $5 or more, the statistic is 5.174 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-
value of 0.1595. Thus, the impact of rules on overall return rates is highest for low 
investment levels, leading to our third result: 
Result  3:  Rules  affect  the  overall  return  rates  most  significantly  when  low 
amounts are invested. 
In both Table 3 Panel B and Panel C, rules decrease the median excess return 
rates  that  represent  voluntary  discretionary  reciprocity  or  trustworthiness.  For 
investments of less than $5, a Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on excess return rates is 18 
 
5.060 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value of 0.1675. In contrast, for investments of $5 or more, the 
statistic is 16.984 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value < 0.01.
10 Thus, in contrast to the total return 
effect, the impact of rules reducing trustworthiness is highest when high amounts are 
invested. 
Result  4: T h e  trustworthiness  reducing  effect  of  rules  is  strongest  for  high 
amounts invested. 
Combined, Results 3 and 4 tell a particularly interesting story. Rules have a large 
impact on overall return rates (Table 3, Panel A), but this shows up primarily when 
investors show little trust (Table 3, Panel B). Overall return rates drop significantly under 
the 10% rule and then rise as the rule increases (Result 3). But, this rise is primarily 
driven  by  the  direct  effect  of  the  rules  increasing  the  mandatory  return  rates.  The 
discretionary return rate is low when investors invest less (i.e. <$5) regardless of the 
rule (Result 4). In contrast, overall return rates are high when investors invest $5 or 
more  (Table  3  Panel  C).  The  substitution  effects  seen  between  rules  and 
trustworthiness (discretionary return rates) offset each other as rules are imposed and 
increased. However, even when investors invest more than $5, trustworthiness drops 
dramatically when rules are imposed and stays low as rules rise. We explore this in 
greater detail in the multivariate analysis in Section IV. 
B  Effect of Rules on Investment Levels 
Table 4 Panel A gives the overall mean and median investor (net) profit rates, defined 
as the investor’s payoff minus the endowment divided by the endowment. Under the 0% 
rule, the mean profit rate is near zero (mean=1.7%) and the median is zero. Under the 
10% and 20% rules the mean and median are negative. Under the 30% rule typical 
                                              
10In  running  this  test  we  round  the  excess  return  rate  to  four  decimal  places,  as  the  subjects  were 
required to return amounts in penny increments. Allowing increased decimal places alters the number of 
ties, and thus reported statistics, but does not alter significance or interpretation.  19 
 
profit rates achieve their highest value (mean=15.9% and median=6.3%) and return to 
positive levels. If the rule is intended to avoid investors’ losses, it is ineffective unless 
the minimum return rate is sufficiently high.20 
 
 
Table 4 Panels B and C give the overall mean and median profit rates when the 
amount  sent  is  less  than  $5  and  greater  than  or  equal  to  $5. F o r   lower  levels  of 
investment in Panel B, rules seem to positively increase profitability, but at higher levels 
of investment the effect is non-monotonic. Overall rules initially dampen profit rates in 
R10 and R20 compared to R0, but profits return with R30. 
Result 5: Investor net profit rates fall when a rule is first imposed, then rise as 
the rule rises. 
What drives this U-shaped result? Is it the investors changing their investment 
pattern? Or do returns on investment change? To gain insight we decompose investor 
profit rate into two components: investment rate and return on investment (defined in 
Table  2). I nvestment  levels  create  the  opportunities  for  profit,  while  the  returns  on 
investment proxy for reciprocity indicating directly whether investments are justified. We 
examine each separately. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of investments under each rule. The two colors in 
the histogram bars represent investments with positive versus negative net returns on 
investment. Clearly, rules affect the investment distributions with the largest apparent 
impact arising under the 30% rule, where only 10% of the investment is at risk. Under a 
0% minimum return rule, there is a fairly disperse distribution of investments with modes 
at $0, near $4 and $10. Most of the investments of more than $5 are profitable. 
Table  4  Panel  A  gives  the  overall  mean  investment  rate  (55.4%),  median 
investment rate (45.0%) and the percentage of observations where the investment was 
zero  (14%) u nder  a  0%  minimum  return  rule.  It  also  shows  the  mean  (-12%)  and 
median (0%) overall return on investment. The results here accord with prior research. 21 
 
The median investor invests just under half of the endowment and approximately breaks 
even. 
Under  the  10%  minimum  return  rule,  the  investment  distribution  remains 
disperse, but drops on average (mean=46.0%, median=38.8%). Returns on investment 
drop significantly (mean=-29%, median=-65%). With a lone exception, positive returns 
on investment only accrue to investors who invest $7 or more. Because the investment 
level falls, investors are responding to the rule but not according to the value-at-risk 
hypothesis. Under the 20% and 30% rules, the investment distributions come back up 
as do typical returns on investment. Only under the 30% rule do the mean and median 
returns on investment exceed those observed under the 0% rule. 
In summary, the immediate effect of a low minimum return rule is to decrease 
investment levels and returns on investment. As the minimum rule increases, the mean 
and median investment levels rise as do the returns on investment. However, only for 
the highest rule do the overall returns on investment rise above the 0% rule. As with the 
return rates, we observe a “U-shaped” response function. A Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic 
shows that the effect is significant. The shape is only consistent with the information 
hypothesis. This gives our next result: 
Result 6: Rules have significant effects on the distribution of investment levels 
that are consistent only with the information hypothesis. 
Because there is a one-to-one direct relationship between investment rates and 
efficiency, the same result holds for economic efficiency. The implication is that if the 
rule is intended to encourage investment and economic efficiency, it is ineffective until 
the  minimum  return  rate  is  sufficiently  high.  Consistent  with  Gneezy  and  Rustichini 22 
 
(2000a),  and  Falk  and  Kosfeld  (2006),  instituting  a  (weak)  rule  has  the  unintended 
consequence of dampening behavior the institution was promoting. 
In Table 4, we report two measures of return on investment, for both all and only 
positive amounts sent. Regardless of the metric, we find initially that rules erode median 
returns  on  investment  regardless  of  the  amount  invested.  Increasing  rules  generally 
increase returns on investment. As shown in Panel A this effect is significant overall. 
However, the effects are not significant for high investment levels as shown in Panel C. 
Result 7: Overall, the returns on investment are “U-shaped” with respect to rules. 
While there is a significant relationship for low investment levels, there is no significant 
relationship for high investment levels. 
Notice  that  the  mixture  of  investment  levels  changes  with  the  rule.  Trustees 
respond to higher investment levels with higher returns on investment (trustworthiness). 
There are relatively more high investment investors under a 30% rule than a 10% rule. 
In Panel B note that average returns on positive investments are negative and almost 
mirror  the  value-at-risk  for  low  investment  levels  when  rules  other  than  zero  are 
implemented. Consequently, if the rule is intended to protect investors, it is ineffective 
until  the  minimum  return  guaranteed  is  sufficiently  high.  The  combined  shift  in 
investment levels and trustee responses across rules explains the significance overall. 
We explore this in more detail in the regression analysis next. 
IV  Regression Analysis 
Our analysis so far suggests that outcomes are driven by three effects: (1) rules directly 
affect  trustee  returns  by  imposing  a  floor; ( 2)  rules  affect  investment  levels; ( 3) 
investment levels affect trustworthiness as measured by the discretionary returns given 23 
 
by trustees. The first is a direct rule effect on returns. The second and third create an 
indirect effect. Of course, there may be interaction effects as well. These are illustrated 
in  Figure  4.  First,  we  will  estimate  the  effect  of  rules  on  investment  and  trust,  then 
estimate  the  combined  effects  of  rules,  investment  and  trust  on  return  rates  and 
trustworthiness. 
A  Investment and Trust Levels 
Our  prior  analysis  suggests  a  non-linear  relationship  between  rules  and  investment 
levels and the distribution of investments are decidedly non-normal. Thus, we estimate 
the relationship between the rule and investment level using median regression of a 
quadratic function, giving the following estimated relationship: 
   (1) 
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99% 
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal.  
  However, investment does not necessarily indicate a high degree of trust. High 
investment under a high minimum return rule may reflect a high level of assurance as 
reflected  by  the  minimum  return  rate.  We  argue  that  trust  based  investments  occur 
when one willingfully cedes resources with the expectation of being reciprocated by 
another (more often than not accompanied by expected profits), though it is known that 
other could opportunisitically profit. is deliberately making oneself vulnerable. This form 
of  trust  may  be  better  proxied  by  the  total  value  the  investor  puts  at  risk  as  a 
consequence of chosen investment level. Using value at risk as the dependent variable 
gives similar results: 24 
 
   (2) 
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99% 
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal. Of course, some of the rule 
effect here is mechanical. For any given level of investment, the VAR is lower with a 
higher rule. 
  In  either  case,  the  negative  coefficient  on  Rule  captures  the  decrease  in 
investment  level  and  trust  between  a  0%  to  10%  rule  and  the  positive  quadratic 
coefficient captures the curvature. Figure 5 shows the mean, median and estimated 
median (according to equation 1) investment levels along with the maximum value at 
risk for each rule (which directly reflects the percentage of the investment at risk). The 
predicted and actual median investment levels track closely. The immediate effect of 
imposing  a  rule  is  to  decrease  the  investment  level.  As  the  rule  increases,  the 
percentage  of  the  investment  that  is  at  risk  falls  and  the  investment  levels  rise  in 
response. Figure 6 presents a similar graph for the total value that the investor places at 
risk. Again, predicted and actual levels track closely. Minimum return rules cap the total 
value that can be placed at risk, thereby decreasing the percentage of potential value at 
risk. The end result is an overall inverse relationship between the rule and value placed 
at risk. 
B  Return Rates and Trustworthiness 
Prior analysis suggests that rules affect trustee behavior in a non-linear fashion. Using 
similar  analysis  as  in  estimation  of  equations  (1)  and  (2),  we  estimate  a  median 25 
 
regression  assuming  quadratic  relationship  for  the  percentage  of  funds  returned  by 
trustees (Return Rate) and rules: 
   (3) 
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “**” denotes significance at the 95% 
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal. The number of observations 
has fallen because Return Rate is not defined if the investment level is zero. 
Similar to prior research, trustees return about a third of funds received without a 
rule (more properly, with a 0% minimum return rule). This makes the investor break 
even for the median trustee. The negative coefficient on Rule captures the decrease in 
return rates moving between 0% to 10% rules and the positive quadratic coefficient 
captures the curvature. While there is significant curvature, the estimated median return 
rate (according to equation 3) in Figure 7 does not match the data nearly as well as the 
estimated investment rate (from equation 1) in Figure 5. This suggests that there is 
significantly more to determining median return rates than the rule alone. 
Indeed, we would not expect rules alone to explain behavior. We hypothesize 
that there is a complex direct, indirect, and interaction effect between rules, investment 
levels  or  trust,  and  returns.  The  simplest  way  to  consider  these  effects  in  terms  of 
estimation and interpretation of the result is to estimate the direct trust effects at the 
same time as the direct rule and interaction effects of Figure 4. We start with a median 
regression, measuring return rates as the percentage of funds received that are actually 26 
 
returned by the trustee and using investment level as the independent variable.
11 This 

















   (4) 
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99% 
level of confidence, Investment is measured by the amount sent, Rule is measured as a 
decimal and Interaction is Investment times Rule.
12  
According to the Pseudo R
2, including investment and interaction terms in this 
regression results in much more explanatory power. The result shows a positive impact 
of rules on overall return rates. There is also an indirect effect through the significant, 
positive investment effect. But, that is not the entire story. According to the interaction 
term, rules significantly dampen the ability for investors to elicit higher returns through 
higher investment levels. Further, part of the increase in the overall return rate is driven 
by the mechanical effect of increasing lower bounds on returns. This does not address 
whether rules affect reciprocity or trustworthiness itself. 
The  negative  interaction  term  in  equation  (4)  indicates  that  higher  minimum 
return rules dampen the ability of investors to elicit trustworthy behavior through higher 
investment levels. We conjecture that this arises because higher rules constrain the 
information space available capable of demonstrating to trustees whether investors are 
actually  “trustors”.  Increasing  minimum  return  rules  reduces  demonstrable  trust  by 
                                              
11Of course, we could effectively estimate the same combined effects by first estimating the effect of rules 
on trust by estimating equation (1), then using the residual trust from that regression, linear and squared 
rules and combinations of interaction terms. However, this unnecessarily complicates the interpretation of 
the results. 
12Note  that  the  non-linear  effects  of  rules  on  investment  capture  a  non-linear  indirect  effect  that  can 
account  for  a  “U-shaped”  response  function.  Adding  a  second  order  term  on  rules  along  with  the 
interaction  between  investment  and  the  rule  squared  changes  some  point  estimates,  but  it  doesn’t 
change signs, significance levels or interpretations of this or any of the subsequent regressions.  27 
 
increasing the limits on downside risk that investors can demonstrate. To understand 
how much of the interaction effect is due to this reduction in value at risk caused by 
increasing minimum return rules, we re-run the regression using value at risk as the 
independent variable representing trust directly. As a result, we will label VAR as Trust 
















   (5) 
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99% 
level of confidence, Trust is measured by the dollar Value at Risk (VAR) taken on by the 
investor (jointly determined by the investment level and the rule), Rule is measured as a 
decimal and Interaction is Trust times Rule. Notice that the interaction term ceases to 
be significant. According to the pseudo R
2, we have lost little explanatory power.  
To  understand  how  much  of  the  direct  rule  effect  is  due  to  the  mechanical 
increase in minimum mandated returns and separate out the effects on discretionary 
returns, we re-run the regression using the discretionary return rate as the dependent 
variable. This subtracts out the non-voluntary component of the return rate and focuses 
solely  on  the  discretionary  reciprocity  or  trustworthiness  voluntarily  displayed  by  the 




















where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, Trust is measured by the value at 
risk (VAR), Rule is measured as a decimal and Interaction is Trust times Rule.
13  
Notice that the only thing that has changed is the coefficient on Rule and its 
significance. This is because we have subtracted out exactly one times the rule (see  
Table 1 for the exact definition) in each observation to arrive at the discretionary returns. 
All other variations in returns are purely discretionary. The remaining direct effect of the 
rule on trustworthiness is not significant. That is, the entire significance of the rules’ 
direct  effect  is  in  the  effect  on  higher  mandated  returns,  not  on  the  discretionary 
behavior of trustees. In the end, the only significant effect on trustworthiness is through 
the amount of trust displayed in the value at risk undertaken by the investors. 
C  Summary of Regression Results 
Combined, these regressions tell an interesting story. Equation (1) shows that 
investment levels initially fall with 10% rule and, eventually, rise as the rule increases. 
However, this rise is not due to more trust. Equation (2) shows that trust, as displayed 
by the value the investors place at risk (VAR) declines with the rule. While the relative 
amount invested increases, the rules prevent an overall increase in trust displayed by 
VAR.  
Equations (3) through (6) show that any positive impact of higher rules on return 
rates does not result from the impact of higher rules on trustworthiness. Instead, any 
potential positive effects come indirectly by promoting more investment or more trusting 
behavior from investors. However, when rules are implemented, investment and trust 
                                              
13 Nearly identical results hold if we scale the discretionary return when dividing by the amount available 
(i.e., dividing by one minus the rule). 29 
 
both fall. This leads to lower return rates. As rules increase the minimum mandated 
return, investment rates rise and increasing rules increase return rates.  
Despite  evidence  that  they  encourage  higher  relative  investment  in  their 
extremes, higher rules inhibit the ability of investors to place themselves at risk and, 
hence, demonstrate trust by placing value at risk. Further, as equation (6) shows, the 
only significant factor driving trustworthy behavior (defined as returning more than the 
mandated minimum) is the amount of trust demonstrated. With the 0% minimum return 
rule, each additional dollar invested generates 5.56% in discretionary returns from the 
trustee (increasing return on investment by more than 16 percentage points). With a 
30% rule, the amount each additional dollar invested generates in discretionary returns 
is cut to 1.37% (increasing return on investment by just over 4 percentage points). 
In summary, with a 0% minimum return rule, investors break even on average. 
However, investors can generate high returns by displaying trust through high levels of 
value at risk. With a 0% rule, all of the reciprocity results from trustworthiness. Thus, 
trust  elicits  trustworthiness.  As  larger  minimum  return  rules  are  implemented,  return 
rates drop on average, then finally rise. The fall results from (1) less trust displayed by 
investors and (2) less trustworthy behavior by trustees given a level of trust. As the rule 
rises, return rates rise. However, this rise is driven by the higher mandated minimum 
returns.  While  investment  rises  back  up,  increasing  minimum  return  rules  inhibit 
displays of trust (as displayed by greater value at risk). As a result, trustworthy behavior 
does not return. 
Figure  9  shows  the  overall  relationship  between  rules,  investment,  trust  and 
trustworthiness. Level of investment is measured by the percentage of the endowment 30 
 
invested. Level of trust is measured by the amount investors put at risk (VAR). The 
levels of trustworthiness are measured as the discretionary return rate (i.e., the return 
rate minus the required return rate). Notice that in spite of skyrocketing investment as 
the rule rises to 30%, the levels of trust and trustworthiness remain low. 
V  Discussion and Conclusions 
We study the interaction of exogenously imposed formal rules and behavior in games 
where  economic  efficiency  and  the  distribution  of  resources  depend  on  trust  and 
reciprocity.  Understanding  this  interaction  is  important.  Social  contracts  commonly 
depend on trusting and reciprocating relationships. They enable resource exchange in 
small-scale  subsistence  societies  and  in  modern  economies  these  relationships 
determine outcomes in conjunction with formal rules and explicit contracting. Trust and 
trustworthiness remain fundamental components of efficient interactions. 
Interactions that require trust involve a basic social dilemma where agents have 
to  trade  off  self-interest  and  safety  with  the  potential  social  benefits  that  arise  from 
trusting behavior. For example, in the trust game, trust leads to net gains overall and 
creates possible profits for investors but also creates a risk of net loss if trustees do not 
reciprocate. On the other hand, failure to trust eliminates entirely the potential gain. 
Effectively, this is a situation of nothing ventured, nothing gained. Trustees must trade 
off personal gains from keeping money given to them with generating social reputational 
value by demonstrating trustworthiness through voluntarily returning funds to investors. 
We argue that one incentive for investors offsetting the financial risk of investing 
in  trustees  is  that  they  acquire  information  about  the  trustworthiness  of  exchange 31 
 
partners in general.
14 Trustees demonstrate trustworthiness by voluntarily giving back 
some of their profits to investors. While minimum return rules reduce downside risk for 
investors, they may also limit the information generating potential of the exchange by 
constraining the amount that can be returned voluntarily.
15 While reduced downside risk 
should  encourage  investment,  limited  information  potential  may  discourage  it.  Our 
results indicate both factors are important. 
We argue that, by voluntarily returning funds, trustees invest in the general stock 
of  social/informational  capital  at  their  own  expense.  Without  minimum  return  rules, 
trustees have to decide how much to return based on their own expectations about the 
value of information and what should be done in context. Rules restrict their ability to 
show trustworthiness through voluntary discretionary reciprocity. Rules may also serve 
to calibrate expectations indicating what return rates are “good enough” and, as a result, 
behavior may effectively fall to the rule. For either or both of the above reasons, our 
results indicate that this is exactly the case. Without a rule, trustee return rates rise 
above self-interest. With a rule, they fall to near the minimum necessary.
16 
                                              
14While  we  study  a  single,  anonymous  interaction,  we  believe  trust  and  reciprocity  are  rooted  in  a 
complex  set  of  social  interactions,  experience,  and  evolved  computational  psychology  that  integrate 
information and apply our gathered knowledge. Every opportunity to show trust and trustworthiness builds 
the stock of reputational information that people can potentially capitalize on or computationally apply to 
contextualized i n t e r a c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  t r u s t  g a m e ,  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  m a k i n g  c h o i c e s  t h a t  n o t  o n l y  a f f e c t  t h e i r  
immediate payoffs, but also allow them to learn about the reputations of the trustees that they may find 
valuable in their own right, in future trust and investment games, or in other potential interactions or 
applications. 
15Consider a real world situation: credit scores. One way to establish a high credit score is to take out a 
loan and pay it back. A simple way to do this is to put a balance on a credit card and pay it off. This 
shows that you are a responsible borrower; you establish a reputation for repayment through your credit 
score and, in turn, affect future borrowing opportunities. We argue that, if a borrower repays a loan when 
there is no minimum payment, it would generate the most reputational information. Paying off the loan 
over  time  by  making  minimum  payments  mandated  by  a  minimum  payment  rule  inhibits  reputation 
formation and, hence, may limit future opportunities that depend on credit ratings such as future loans, 
job opportunities, security clearances, etc. 
16Alternatively, the rules may form a focal point that attracts both investor and trustee behavior. Among 
others, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1990) and Mehta, Starmer and Sugden (1994) argue that 32 
 
Modern economic and social systems present many challenges to building and 
maintaining  trust  relationships.  In  large  systems,  relationships  become  numerous, 
impersonal  and  onerous  to  monitor.  It  becomes  difficult  to  socially  sanction 
untrustworthy behavior (e.g. with ostracism, shunning, or negative gossip). Trust may 
be  compromised  (Khalil,  1994).  Nevertheless,  cross-national  studies  of  trust  indices 
suggest  that  populations  that  can  rely  upon  well-developed  social  and  legal 
mechanisms for limiting opportunism have higher levels of trust (Zak and Knack, 2001). 
At the margin, do simple minimum return rules encourage or discourage trust and 
trustworthy behaviors? Overall, we find that by experimentally increasing rules’ control 
over returned investments trust and trustworthiness does not increase. Trustworthiness 
measured by the median level of voluntary discretionary returns to investors, virtually 
disappears with rules. Further, while returns increase when the minimum required return 
increases, voluntary displays of trustworthiness never recover. The median investment 
level also falls when a minimum return rule is imposed. While investment levels rise 
under sufficiently high return rules, this does not represent a return to trusting behavior. 
It reflects the simple fact that investors have less at risk. Thus, rules limiting investors’ 
downside-risk decrease both trust and trustworthy behavior. Only sufficiently restrictive 
rules increase investment in spite of the lost of trust. 
                                                                                                                                              
focal  points  serve  as  equilibrium  selection  criteria  in  coordination  games.  Binmore,  Swierzbinski  and 
Proulx  (1993)  argue  specifically  that  common  experience  can  create  focal  points  that  determine 
equilibrium selection in bargaining games. Here, a 50/50 split of the cash is a simple focal point that may 
explain behavior in the absence of a return rule. When a rule is introduced, the rule may serve as a 
second possible focal point. As a result, trustees may return exactly the amount mandated by the rule. 
Fearing this, investors may not send any cash in the first place. In the context of our one-shot experiment, 
any  reduction  in  investment  resulting  from  the  reduced  information  space  or  from  the  focal  point  is 
observationally  equivalent.  Future  research  should  focus  on  how  to  distinguish  between  these  two 
alternative motivations. 33 
 
We  study  a  relatively  abstract  and  simple  game,  stripping  away  many  of  the 
complexities  of  social  context.  This  allows  a  detailed  understanding  of  a  simple 
interaction. However, there are many analogs in more complex environments and some 
tantalizing field evidence on the interaction between rules and behavior that accord with 
our results. While it can create benefits, adding rules or enforcing them can be counter-
productive, as the day care and worker monitoring examples show. Removing them can 
improve  outcomes.  For  example,  the  “Monderman  Principal”  of  traffic  control  (e.g., 
Clarke, 2006) shows that removing curbs, lane markings, traffic signs, etc., can improve 
traffic  safety  and  reduce  congestion.  As  Clarke  (2006,  p.  291)  puts  it:  “The 
driver…becomes an integral part of the social and cultural context. As a result, behavior 
is controlled by everyday norms…” Our results are consistent with this from the opposite 
direction: here, rules replace the behavior trustees would otherwise use. 
We believe the implications are clear: If a system based on trust is not broken or 
violations  of  trust  are  infrequent,  it  is  wise  to  not  tamper  with  it  via  rules  imposing 
minimum standards of behavior. Let sleeping dogs lie. However, if a trust-based system 
is not functioning well in the absence of rules, it might be improved with the addition of 
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VII  Tables and Figures 
 
 
 Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Treatment  Description of Treatment  Number of Subjects 
R0  Trustee returns any portion of amount received  42 
R10  Trustee must return at least 10% of amount received  48 
R20  Trustee must return at least 20% of amount received  40 
R30  Trustee must return at least 30% of amount received  48 
 
 
Table 2: Definitions of Investment, Return and Profit Rates 
Term  Definition 
Return Rate (Reciprocity)  (Amount Returned)/(Amount Received) if Amount 
Received > 0 and not defined otherwise 
Discretionary Return Rate (Trustworthiness) 
 




Value at Risk (Trust) 
 
(Amount Sent)x(1-Rule) 
Return on Investment  (Amount Returned – Amount Sent)/(Amount Sent) 
if Amount Sent > 0 and 0 otherwise 
Investor Net Profit Rate  (Investor Payoff – Endowment)/Endowment  
= (Amount Returned – Amount Sent)/Endowment 





Table 3: Amounts Returned and Return Rates by Rule and Amount Sent 
 
Panel A: Amount Sent > $0 
Return Levels  Return Rates 
Rule  % of Obs. 
% Returned  
within $0.01  
of Minimum  Mean  Median 
Median  
Excess  Mean  Median 
Median  
Excess 
0%  86%  17%  $6.65  $7.00  $7.00  29%  35%  35% 
10%  88%  57%  $4.36  $1.50  $0.01  22%  10%  0% 
20%  95%  42%  $5.23  $3.30  $0.55  30%  28%  7% 
30%  100%  38%  $9.42  $10.00  $1.46  38%  36%  6% 






Panel B: Amount sent greater than $0 and less than $5 
0%  38%  25%  $1.59  $1.25  $1.25  15%  12%  12% 
10%  46%  81%  $1.09  $1.05  $0.00  15%  10%  0% 
20%  40%  50%  $1.64  $1.53  $0.15  29%  24%  4% 
30%  21%  80%  $2.36  $2.70  $0.00  31%  30%  0% 






Panel C: Amount sent greater than or equal to $5 
0%  48%  10%  $10.70  $11.50  $11.50  40%  45%  45% 
10%  42%  30%  $7.95  $7.50  $5.55  31%  37%  27% 
20%  55%  36%  $7.85  $8.00  $3.00  31%  30%  10% 
30%  79%  26%  $11.29  $12.00  $3.00  40%  40%  10% 









Table 4: Amounts Invested and Returns on Investment by Rule 
 
Panel A: All Data 















Invest $0  Mean  Med.  Mean  Med.  Mean  Med.  Mean  Med.  Mean  Med. 
0%  21  14%  1.7%  0.0%  55.4%  45.0% 
-
12.0%  0.0% 
-
14.0%  5.0%  54.5%  50.0% 








69.9%  55.0%  50.0% 
20%  20  5%  -3.3%  -7.8%  53.0%  50.0%  -8.6% 
-
15.1%  -9.1% 
-
17.6%  52.9%  50.0% 
30%  24  0%  15.9%  6.3%  78.3%  100.0%  14.7%  9.3%  14.7%  9.3%  47.5%  47.7% 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Statistic  9.063**  10.615**  9.539**  10.920**  1.241 
P-value  0.0285  0.014  0.0229  0.0122  0.7432 
 
Panel B: Amount sent less than $5 












62.7%  65.8%  60.0% 
10%  14  21% 
-








70.0%  67.6%  71.9% 








28.8%  71.0%  65.7% 
30%  5  0%  -1.9%  -2.0%  25.5%  30.0%  -8.0% 
-
10.0%  -8.0% 
-
10.0%  66.1%  62.5% 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Statistic  2.117  0.900  4.184  11.885**  0.341 
P-value  0.5484  0.8255  0.2423  0.0078  0.9521 
 
Panel C: Amount sent greater than or equal to $5 
0%  10  N/A  16.5%  27.5%  90.5%  100.0%  19.6%  35.9%  19.6%  35.9%  42.0%  48.2% 
10%  10  N/A  -2.5%  10.0%  82.0%  95.0%  -7.7%  10.0%  -7.7%  10.0%  37.3%  42.7% 
20%  11  N/A  -2.0% 
-
10.0%  80.5%  90.0%  -5.7% 
-
10.0%  -5.7% 
-
10.0%  38.1%  40.0% 
30%  19  N/A  20.6%  20.0%  92.2%  100.0%  20.7%  20.0%  20.7%  20.0%  42.6%  46.2% 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Statistic  5.529  4.107  5.174  5.174  2.352 
P-value  0.1369  0.2502  0.1595  0.1595  0.5027 
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Median Return 41 
 
Figure 2: Histograms of Return Rate as Fraction of Amount Received by 
Treatment 
 
Axis reports the percentage returned by the trustee given investment. Light bars 




Figure 3: Histograms of Investments by Rule 
 
Axis reports the dollar amount invested. Light bars represent investments leading to 











Figure 5: Mean, Median and Predicted Median Investment Levels by Rule 
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Figure 6: Mean, Median and Predicted Trust (as measured by Value at Risk) 
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Figure 8: Mean, Median and Predicted Median Discretionary Return Rates 




Figure 9: Median Investment Rates, Values at Risk (Trust) and  
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VIII Appendix: Instructions for the R20 Treatment 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided 
funds for this research. The currency used in the experiment is experimental dollars, and they will be 
converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 1 experimental dollar to 1 dollar. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very important that you remain silent and do not 
look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your 
hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc… you will be asked to 
leave and you will not be paid. We expect, and appreciate, you adhering to these policies.  
 
THE EXPERIMENT 
The participants in today's experiment will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to 
the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, 
designated as Person 1 or Person 2. You and the other participant in your group will make choices that 
will determine your payoffs. The experiment consists of two decision stages. 
 
In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. Person 1 can 
send none, more than none, or all of the $10 to Person 2. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before 
reaching Person 2. In stage 2, Person 2 decides how many of the dollars they received to send back to 
Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%, more than 20%, or all of the amount received back to Person 1. 
At that point the experiment is over. 
 




Stage 1: Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. Person 1 can 
send none, more than none, or all of the $10. Person 1 enters the amount sent to Person 2 in the box 
labeled “The amount sent by Person 1” below. Person 1 keeps any amount that is not sent to Person 2. 





Stage 2: After learning the amount sent by Person 1, Person 2 decides how many dollars to send back to 
Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%, more than 20%, or all of the amount in Person 2's account at 
that time. Person 2 enters the amount sent back to Person 1 in the box labeled “The amount sent back by 
Person 2” below. The amount sent back by Person 2 is NOT multiplied. Person 2 keeps any amount that 
is not sent back to Person 1. 
 
 
Finally, at the end of the Stage 2 the total earnings are reported to each person. 
●  Person 1's earnings will equal $10 less the amount sent to Person 2 plus the amount sent back 
by Person 2. 
●  Person 2's earning will equal three times the amount sent by Person 1 less the amount sent back 
to Person 1. 
Please record the decisions and your earnings on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
SUMMARY 
The computer will assign you and one other participant to a two-person group, consisting of Person 1 
and Person 2. In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 
2. Person 1 can send none, more than none, or all of the $10. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled. In 
stage 2, Person 2 decides how many dollars to send back to Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%, 
more than 20%, or all of the amount in Person 2's account at that time. At the end of Stage 2 the total 
earnings are reported to each person. This experiment is now over and your earnings will be part of the 





We list hypothetical amounts below at $0.25 intervals to illustrate how the amount sent by Person 1 is 
tripled, and how much Person 2 has to send back. 
If Person 1 sends 
Then Person 2 
Receives 
Person 2 can send back 
between 
0.00  0.00  0.00  -  0.00  
0.25  0.75  0.15  -  0.75  
0.50  1.50  0.30  -  1.50  
0.75  2.25  0.45  -  2.25  
1.00  3.00  0.60  -  3.00  
1.25  3.75  0.75  -  3.75  
1.50  4.50  0.90  -  4.50  
1.75  5.25  1.05  -  5.25  
2.00  6.00  1.20  -  6.00  
2.25  6.75  1.35  -  6.75  
2.50  7.50  1.50  -  7.50  
2.75  8.25  1.65  -  8.25  
3.00  9.00  1.80  -  9.00  
3.25  9.75  1.95  -  9.75  
3.50  10.50  2.10  -  10.50  
3.75  11.25  2.25  -  11.25  
4.00  12.00  2.40  -  12.00  
4.25  12.75  2.55  -  12.75  
4.50  13.50  2.70  -  13.50  
4.75  14.25  2.85  -  14.25  
5.00  15.00  3.00  -  15.00  
5.25  15.75  3.15  -  15.75  
5.50  16.50  3.30  -  16.50  
5.75  17.25  3.45  -  17.25  
6.00  18.00  3.60  -  18.00  
6.25  18.75  3.75  -  18.75  
6.50  19.50  3.90  -  19.50  
6.75  20.25  4.05  -  20.25  
7.00  21.00  4.20  -  21.00  
7.25  21.75  4.35  -  21.75  
7.50  22.50  4.50  -  22.50  
7.75  23.25  4.65  -  23.25  
8.00  24.00  4.80  -  24.00  
8.25  24.75  4.95  -  24.75  
8.50  25.50  5.10  -  25.50  
8.75  26.25  5.25  -  26.25  
9.00  27.00  5.40  -  27.00  
9.25  27.75  5.55  -  27.75  
9.50  28.50  5.70  -  28.50  
9.75  29.25  5.85  -  29.25  





Before  starting,  we  want  you  to  answer  some  questions  regarding  the  experiment  to  be  sure  you 
understand  what  will  follow.  After  five  minutes  an  experimenter  will  return  to  privately  review y o u r  
answers. Afterwards you will participate in the experiment only one time. 
1.  True or false: the amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2's account. 
2.  True or false: the amount sent back by Person 2 is tripled before reaching Person 1's account. 
3.  What is the largest amount Person 1 can send to Person 2? 
4.  What is the smallest amount Person 1 can send back to Person 1? 
5.  If Person 1 sent $4.20 to Person 2, what is largest amount Person 2 can send back to Person 1?  
6.  If Person 1 sent $9.00 to Person 2, what is smallest amount Person 2 can send back to Person 
1?  
7.  True or false: If Person 1 sends something to Person 2, then Person 2 has to send something 
back to Person 1. 
8.  True or false: you will participate in the experiment one time. Economic Science Institute Working Papers 
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